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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal requires us to decide whether the relation 
back of amendments provision of Rule 15 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") is consistent with 
28 U.S.C. S 2255 and the rules governing S 2255 
proceedings, such that an amendment to a timelyfiled 
S 2255 petition may relate back to the date of the petition 
after the expiration of the one-year period of limitations 
prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). We hold that it can. Under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(c), an amendment which, by way of additional 
facts, clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory in the petition 
may, in the District Court's discretion, relate back to the 
date of that petition if and only if the petition was timely 
filed and the proposed amendment does not seek to add a 
new claim or to insert a new theory into the case. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's summary 
dismissal of Thomas's petition and will remand for the 
Court to determine whether petitioner's proposed 
amendment does or does not relate back to the date of his 
petition. 
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I. 
 
The facts underlying this appeal are simply stated. In 
1995, a jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania found 
petitioner Leroy Thomas ("Thomas") guilty of conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 
U.S.C. S 846. Thomas was sentenced to 135 months in 
prison to be followed by five years of supervised release. He 
appealed, and we affirmed his conviction and sentence. The 
Supreme Court denied Thomas's petition for a writ of 
certiorari on May 12, 1997. 
 
Thomas, pro se, thereafter timely filed aS 2255 petition. 
The petition consisted of a standardized form provided by 
the Clerk of the Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania which directs petitioners to: 
 
       (9) State concisely every ground on which you claim 
       that you are being held unlawfully. CAUTION: If you 
       fail to set forth all grounds in this motion, you may be 
       barred from presenting additional grounds at a later 
       date. You must allege facts in support of the ground or 
       grounds which you choose. A mere statement of 
       grounds without facts will be rejected. 
 
       (a) Grounds 
 
       (b) Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly 
       without citing cases or law). 
 
App. at 8 (emphasis in original). Thomas completed the 
form and, in response to item 9(a), outlined a veritable 
laundry list of grounds in a two-page attachment. 1 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Thomas listed twenty-six separate grounds, but misnumbered two, 
resulting in an undercount such that there appear to be only twenty- 
four. Accordingly, in quoting the grounds in full below, we have labeled 
the erroneously double-counted issues as 8[A], 8[B], 14[A] and 14[B]: 
 
       Issue Number 1: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to argue 
       that the sentence and conviction were fruit from a poisonous tree 
       and is[,] therefore[,] in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the 
       Constitution. 
 
       Issue Number 2: Counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that 
the 
       indictment was illegal because it was fruit from a poisonous tree. 
 
       Issue Number 3: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move 
       for dismissal of the indictment because it was not brought about 
       within 30 days from my arrest. 
                                 3 
  
response to item 9(b), soliciting supporting facts, Thomas 
wrote: "facts will be presented in a separate memorandum 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Issue Number 4: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to file 
a 
       motion to dismiss the indictment where it was not signed by the 
       foreperson of the grand jury and where it was not properly sealed. 
 
       Issue Number 5: Defense counsel was ineffective where he failed to 
       request a mistrial when the prosecution promised to call witness 
but 
       failed to subsequently call such witness. 
 
       Issue Number 6: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to call 
       defense witnesses after he promised petitioner that he would. 
 
       Issue Number 7: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
       advise[ ] petitioner that it was his right to decide whether to 
testify 
       in his defense. 
 
       Issue Number 8[A]: The Government violated the Jencks and Brady 
       Act by failing to turn over certain statements of its witness[es] 
after 
       [they] testified. 
 
       Issue Number 8[B]: The prosecution committed serious misconduct 
       by misrepresenting and defrauding the court and defense. 
 
       Issue Number 9: The government committed prosecutorial 
       misconduct in the closing argument. 
 
       Issue Number 10: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
argue 
       before the court that the sole government [witness] before the 
grand 
       jury committed perjury which was material to the matter at hand. 
 
       Issue Number 11: The prosecution committed misconduct at trial by 
       presenting perjur[ed] testimonies of its witnesses: 
 
       1. Troy Saunders 
 
       2. Benjamin Day 
 
       3. Larry Humphries 
 
       4. Edward Shied 
 
       Issue Number 12: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
       [object to] the introduction of the guns allegedly found in 
apartment 
       next door to petitioner. 
 
       Issue Number 13: The prosecution committed misconduct by 
       advising defense counsel that it will not be introducing guns into 
       trial and then by turning around and introducing the same weapons 
       into evidence. 
 
       Issue Number 14[A]: The prosecution violated Rule 16 of the 
       Discovery Rule by failing to advise the defense of the evidence it 
       intended to introduce as its case-in-chief at trial. 
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of law in support of petition." On May 6, 1998, one day 
after mailing his S 2255 petition and six days prior to the 
expiration of the AEDPA's one-year period of limitations, 
Thomas filed a "Motion to Hold 2255 Petition in Abeyance 
until Petitioner Submits Memorandum of Law in Support of 
the Petition," which he represented would be submitted 
within sixty to ninety days. He argued that he needed 
additional time because the "issues are complicated, 
requiring an extensive review" of the record and because 
his time was limited due to a prison work assignment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Issue Number 14[B]: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
       interview the prosecution witnesses before trial. 
 
       Issue Number 15: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
       interview defense witnesses. 
 
       Issue Number 16: The government failed to prove that the substance 
       allegedly involved in the offense was crack as defined in the 
       sentencing guidelines. 
 
       Issue Number 17: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
       appeal order denying probable cause motion. 
 
       Issue Number 18: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
       appeal the court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss 
       indictment based on perjured testimony. 
 
       Issue Number 19: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
argue 
       on appeal that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. 
 
       Issue Number 20: Petitioner's sentence and conviction is in 
violation 
       of double jeopardy and the due process clause of the Constitution 
of 
       the United States. 
 
       Issue Number 21: The government violated Brady by failing to 
       disclose to the defense that it had made deals with its witnesses. 
 
       Issue Number 22: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
object 
       to the variance between the evidence presented to the grand jury 
       and the evidence presented at trial. 
 
       Issue Number 23: Defense counsel was ineffective in not objecting 
to 
       the Government's witnesses's in-court identification of petitioner. 
 
       Issue Number 24: Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
       impeach the prosecution's witnesses with their prior inconsistent 
       testimonies and statements. 
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The government, in its response to the motion, contended 
that Thomas's request for extra time and permission to file 
a memorandum of law constituted an impermissible end- 
run around the AEDPA's one-year period of limitations. It 
maintained, as well, that the grounds set forth in Thomas's 
petition were vague, conclusory, and lacking in factual 
support and, therefore, were insufficient to entitle him to 
any relief whatsoever. The District Court agreed, and on 
June 29, 1998 denied Thomas's request to file his proposed 
memorandum because it would constitute an amendment 
beyond the AEDPA's period of limitations and dismissed the 
petition on the ground that it failed to set forth a cause of 
action as required by Rule 2 of the Federal Rules Governing 
S 2255 Proceedings. The Court stated: 
 
       Defendant has attached a two-page statement setting 
       forth 24 issues which he alleges to be the grounds for 
       his motion. The statement of these issues, however, is 
       entirely conclusory and details none of the supporting 
       facts. As to the supporting facts, defendant alleges 
       "facts will be presented in a separate Memorandum of 
       Law in support of petition[.]" Were defendant to file a 
       memorandum setting forth the facts supporting his 
       grounds for the motion at the present time, or in the 
       future, the memorandum would, in effect, amend 
       defendant's motion in a material respect after the 
       expiration of the one-year limitation period provided by 
       Section 2255. 
 
Memorandum Order at 2-3. 
 
Thomas filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, asserting that under Rule 15(c)'s 
provision allowing the relation back of amendments, the 
District Court should have permitted him to amend his 
petition with a memorandum of law based on the same 
"conduct, transaction, or occurrence as alleged in the 
original complaint." The Court denied Thomas's motion for 
reconsideration and subsequently denied his request for a 
certificate of appealability. 
 
On September 17, 1999, this Court granted a certificate 
of appealability as to the following issues: (1) whether the 
District Court erred in determining that it lacked the 
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discretion to accept petitioner's memorandum of law 
because it would be filed out of time; and (2) whether Rule 
15 is inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. S 2255 and with the rules 
governing S 2255 and is, therefore, inapplicable to S 2255 
petitions. We also appointed counsel ("CJA Counsel") to 
represent petitioner, and they have ably done so both in 
their briefs and at oral argument. Simultaneously with the 
filing of their opening brief, CJA counsel moved to expand 
the scope of the certificate of appealability to include 
consideration of the factual sufficiency of Thomas's petition. 
This Court granted the request, including in the 
certification: (1) whether the original S 2255 petition 
included sufficient facts to avoid summary dismissal; and 
(2) whether, in light of the strict one-year time limit 
imposed by the AEDPA, district courts confronted with 
S 2255 petitions which the courts deem to include too few 
facts should allow additional filings only for the purpose of 
clarifying and recording factual detail. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 2255 and 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. Typically, we would review a District Court's order 
denying a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. See 
United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 336 (3d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 163 (1999). Here, however, the 
District Court did not exercise its discretion in denying the 
amendment but, rather, apparently believed that it did not 
have the authority to apply Rule 15 to a S 2255 petition. 
The question of whether Rule 15 applies to S 2255 petitions 
implicates the interpretation and application of legal 
precepts; therefore, our standard of review is plenary. See 
Cooney v. Fulcumer, 886 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1989). We 
also exercise plenary review over the legal conclusions 
which prompted the District Court to summarily dismiss 
Thomas's petition. See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
 
A. 
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas 
corpus proceedings "to the extent that the practice in such 
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proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States 
and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil 
actions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2). In addition, the rules 
governing S 2255 proceedings provide that: 
 
       If no procedure is specifically prescribed by these rules, 
       the district court may proceed in any lawful manner 
       not inconsistent with these rules, or any applicable 
       statute, and may apply the Federal Rules of Criminal 
       Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
       whichever it deems most appropriate, to motionsfiled 
       under these rules. 
 
Fed. R. S 2255 Proceedings 12 (emphasis added). Neither 28 
U.S.C. S 2255 nor the rules governing S 2255 proceedings 
explicitly proscribes the relation back of amendments. 
Rather, the statute and governing rules are silent. 
 
The procedures applied to habeas petitions filed after 
April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA, and, 
indeed, the very raison d'etre of the AEDPA itself do, 
however, present a potential inconsistency with the 
language and spirit of Rule 15(c). On the one hand, district 
courts maintain a liberal policy in non-habeas civil 
proceedings of allowing amendments to correct a defective 
pleading or to amplify an insufficiently stated claim and 
relating those amendments back to the date of the original 
filing when the amendments might otherwise have been 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On the other 
hand, Congress clearly intended to limit collateral attacks 
upon judgments obtained in federal criminal cases, an 
intent evidenced by the AEDPA's limitations period for filing 
petitions of one year from "the date on which the judgment 
of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. S 2255; see 
generally United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 651 (3d Cir. 
1999). The government posits that the tension between 
Rule 15(c) and the AEDPA requires us to hold that Rule 
15(c) cannot apply to habeas proceedings in the same 
manner in which it applies to other civil proceedings. We 
disagree. 
 
In United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 163 (1999), this Court addressed 
the apparent inconsistency between Rule 15(a) and the 
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AEDPA. There, Duffus, proceeding pro se,filed a S 2255 
petition seeking relief from his federal conviction and 
sentence for various offenses, including conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine, RICO and money laundering. The 
petition was deemed timely because Duffus had filed it 
within the one-year grace period afforded petitioners after 
the AEDPA's effective date. In the petition, Duffus asserted 
that his attorney had been ineffective in failing to contend 
on appeal that the evidence against Duffus was insufficient 
to convict him of money laundering and in failing to object 
to the District Court's use of the sentencing guidelines in 
effect at the time of sentencing as opposed to those in effect 
at the time Duffus allegedly withdrew from the conspiracy. 
In addition, Duffus asserted that at sentencing the District 
Court had miscalculated the quantity of drugs attributable 
to him. 
 
More than six months after filing his petition, and after 
the one year grace period accorded petitioners after 
AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996 had run, Duffus 
moved to amend the petition to add another ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, this one arising from his 
attorney's alleged failure to move to suppress drug 
evidence. Adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and 
Recommendation, the District Court denied Duffus's motion 
to amend because of Duffus's delay in presenting that claim 
and dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. 
The District Court had earlier allowed Duffus thirty to sixty 
days to supplement his petition, but Duffus waited six 
months before seeking leave to amend. Additionally, he had 
had the benefit of the six years since his conviction, the 
one-year grace period following the enactment of the 
AEDPA, and the six months since the filing of his petition. 
"There was nothing in [Duffus's] motion to amend," found 
the Court, "that could not have been included in the 
original motion." Id. at 336. 
 
On appeal, this Court noted that under Rule 15(a), a 
petitioner may amend his or her pleading once as a matter 
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Rule 15(a) states in relevant part: 
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The government, however, had already filed a responsive 
pleading in Duffus's case. Therefore, Duffus could only 
amend his pleading "by leave of court which leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." Id . at 337 (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). We stated that leave to amend should 
be freely granted unless there is evidence of "undue delay, 
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party 
by virtue of allowing the amendment or futility of 
amendment." Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 
(1962)). Moreover, we noted that "ordinarily delay alone is 
not a basis to deny a motion to amend." Duffus, 174 F.3d 
at 337. Nevertheless, we affirmed the District Court's denial 
of Duffus's motion to amend in light of the "special 
situation" created by the AEDPA's one-year period of 
limitations with its recognized grace period. Had the 
District Court granted Duffus's motion to add a new claim, 
we reasoned, it would have "frustrated the intent of 
Congress that claims under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 be advanced 
within one year after a judgment of conviction becomes 
final[.]" Id. 
 
Duffus stated, however, albeit in dictum , that in certain 
circumstances, a district court could allow an amendment 
to a S 2255 petition after the expiration of the one-year 
period of limitations. Specifically, we noted that, while it 
would frustrate the intent of Congress to allow Duffus to 
amend his petition by adding a "completely new" ground for 
relief after the one-year period of limitations had run, 
"[c]ertainly the court could have permitted an amendment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (a) Amendments. A party may amend the party's pleading once as 
       a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served 
       or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is 
       permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
       calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
       after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's 
pleading 
       only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; 
       and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(a). 
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to clarify a claim initially made." Id. (emphasis added). 
"[W]hile Duffus asserted in his initial motion that his 
attorney had been ineffective, the particular claim with 
respect to failing to move to suppress evidence was 
completely new. Thus, the amendment could not be deemed 
timely under the `relation back' provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(c)." Id. The facts of this case cause us to go where 
Duffus did not have to go and to determine whether 
Duffus's dictum regarding the applicability of Rule 15(c) to 
a S 2255 petition should become the law of this Circuit. 
 
The purpose of Rule 15 "is to provide maximum 
opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits 
rather than on procedural technicalities. This is 
demonstrated by the emphasis Rule 15 places on the 
permissive approach that the district courts are to take to 
amendment requests, no matter what their character may 
be[.]" 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice & Procedure S 1471 (2d ed. 1990)(2000 Supp.) 
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter "Fed. Prac. & Proc."). In the 
context of non-habeas civil proceedings, a party may not 
allege an entirely new claim by amendment after the 
expiration of the statute of limitations. A party may, 
however, attempt to raise and to relate back a new claim 
which would otherwise have been barred by the statute of 
limitations as long as the claim "arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the original 
pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).3  The one-year period of 
limitations contained in the AEDPA is a statute of 
limitations like any other statute of limitations in a civil 
proceeding. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 567 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Rule 15(c) provides in relevant part: 
 
       (c) Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment of a  pleading 
       relates back to the date of the original pleading when 
 
        (1) relation back is permitted by the law that  provides the 
statute 
       of limitations applicable to the action, or 
 
        (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amend ed pleading arose 
       out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted 
       to be set forth in the original pleading[.] 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(c). 
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(3d Cir. 1999). And Duffus teaches that, as in non-habeas 
civil proceedings, a party cannot amend a S 2255 petition to 
add a completely new claim after the statute of limitations 
has expired. Here, we are dealing with yet another type of 
amendment: one which, if we take Thomas at his word, 
merely seeks to correct a pleading deficiency by expanding 
the facts but not the claims alleged in the petition.4 An 
amendment for that purpose would clearly fall within Rule 
15(c). See 6 Fed. Prac. & Proc.S 1474. 
 
A S 2255 petition provides a federal prisoner the 
opportunity to seek one full collateral review of his or her 
conviction and sentence. While we certainly do not suggest 
that a prisoner can willy nilly file papers at his or her 
whim, to eliminate or to compromise what will likely be a 
prisoner's only opportunity to collaterally challenge a 
sentence by refusing to even consider whether a proposed 
amendment relates back to his or her petition would be to 
elevate procedural rules over substance. Thus, we hold that 
Rule 15(c)(2) applies to S 2255 petitions insofar as a District 
Court may, in its discretion, permit an amendment to a 
petition to provide factual clarification or amplification after 
the expiration of the one-year period of limitations, as long 
as the petition itself was timely filed and the petitioner does 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although we do not know precisely what Thomas would have set forth 
in the memorandum he sought to submit, it is probably fair to say, as 
he said, that he intended to amplify his twenty-six grounds with 
additional facts. See App. at 8 ("facts will be presented in a separate 
memorandum of law in support of petition"). Because he has not 
declared an intention to raise a new claim, we need not reach the issue 
of whether a new claim would be proscribed if that claim "arose out of 
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set 
forth in the original pleading." Rule 15(c)(2). We note, however, that at 
least two other circuits have applied Rule 15(c)(2)'s "conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence" test to cases in which S 2255 petitioners 
sought to add new claims to their original petitions after the expiration 
of the statute of limitations. See United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 
317 (4th Cir. 2000)(applying Rule 15(c)(2) and affirming denial of 
permission to amend because proposed amendment arose from separate 
occurrence); United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 
1999)(applying Rule 15(c)(2) and affirming denial of permission to amend 
because proposed claim was "distinctly separate" from claims already 
pled). 
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not seek to add an entirely new claim or new theory of 
relief. 
 
The District Court's denial of Thomas's request tofile a 
memorandum of law and its dismissal of his petition pre- 
dated our ruling in Duffus. We assume that the District 
Court, without Duffus's guidance, was operating under the 
erroneous impression that it did not have the authority 
under Rule 15 to allow an amendment to a habeas petition. 
As a result, the Court did not seek to determine whether 
Thomas would have advanced a new claim or new theory or 
whether he was merely seeking to add meat to the bare 
bones of the numerous grounds he listed in his petition. 
 
In any event, post-Duffus, it is clear that a District Court 
does have the authority under Rule 15(a) to consider a 
motion to amend a habeas petition and, post-Thomas, to 
consider whether the proposed amendment relates back to 
the filing date of the petition after the expiration of the 
statute of limitations. Whether Thomas's proposed 
amendment should be permitted to relate back to the date 
of his petition is a question for the District Court to 
consider on remand.5 
 
B. 
 
Prior to oral argument, this Court enlarged the scope of 
the certificate of appealability to include the issue of 
whether Thomas's S 2255 petition pled sufficient facts to 
avoid summary dismissal.6 This is a question of some 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The government argues that remand would be futile because it is 
inevitable that the District Court will deny Thomas permission to amend. 
This argument is based on the government's assumption that Thomas's 
stated reason for the amendment -- the need for more time -- is 
inadequate because he had sufficient time to familiarize himself with the 
facts of his own case. We express no opinion on the adequacy or 
inadequacy of Thomas's reason for requesting an extension of time, but 
we disagree that the District Court need not address the issue. 
 
6. CJA Counsel argue that the form distributed to habeas petitioners by 
the Clerk of the Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania should be 
changed. Counsels' point is well-taken. The form instructs petitioners to 
"[s]tate concisely every ground," to "allege facts in support of the 
ground 
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significance because were we to find that none of the 
grounds alleged in the petition would entitle Thomas to 
relief, the petition would be subject to summary dismissal. 
See Fed. R. S 2255 Proceedings 4(b). 7 Indeed, we have 
previously held that vague and conclusory allegations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
or grounds," and to "[t]ell your story briefly". App. at 8 (emphasis in 
original). These directives, which emphasize brevity, may well place a 
petitioner in a "Catch-22" situation, wherein he or she may strive to 
meet that requirement at the risk of summary dismissal for failure to 
plead sufficient grounds or facts. Moreover, this form resembles the 
Model form contained in the habeas rules, a form which has not been 
changed since 1982. Prior to the AEDPA, a petitioner whose factual 
allegations were too brief had the opportunity to come back in without 
bumping up against a statute of limitations. Accordingly, we recommend 
that the district courts amend their forms in the following ways. First, 
the form might encourage petitioners to specifically plead facts 
sufficient 
to support their claims. Second, the form might warn petitioners that, 
due to the AEDPA's period of limitations, they may not have the 
opportunity to amend their petitions at a later date. Further, the form 
could perhaps instruct petitioners that while an amendment to clarify or 
to offer further factual support may be permitted at the discretion of the 
District Court, an amendment which seeks to introduce a new claim or 
a new theory into the case will not be permitted after the statute of 
limitations has expired. 
 
These types of amendments to the standard habeas forms would be in 
keeping with this Court's recognition in United States v. Miller, 192 F.3d 
644, 649 (3d Cir. 1999), that the AEDPA has "dramatically altered" the 
nature of federal habeas proceedings. They would also be in keeping with 
the prophylactic rule announced in Miller, see id. at 646, which was 
aimed both at promoting judicial efficiency in these proceedings, and 
insuring that federal habeas petitioners fairly have their one chance to 
obtain collateral relief, see id. at 651. 
 
7. Rule 4(b) states, in relevant part: 
 
       The motion, together with all the files, records, transcripts, and 
       correspondence relating to the judgment under attack, shall be 
       examined promptly by the judge to whom it is assigned. If it 
plainly 
       appears from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and 
       the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled 
to 
       relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its 
       summary dismissal[.] 
 
Fed. R. S 2255 Proceedings 4(b). 
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contained in a S 2255 petition may be disposed of without 
further investigation by the District Court. See United 
States v. Dawson, 857 F.2d 923, 928 (3d Cir. 1988). Were 
all of Thomas's claims vague or conclusory, it could well be 
argued that any later filing would, in effect, constitute an 
attempt to add a new claim or theory, an addition which 
Duffus would prohibit. 
 
The District Court held that Thomas's petition was legally 
insufficient because Thomas failed to set forth facts 
supporting the grounds alleged. We certainly agree that 
more than a few of Thomas's twenty-six grounds appear to 
be quite conclusory and too vague to warrant further 
investigation. See, e.g., Issues Five, Fourteen and Fifteen 
(claims involving the alleged failure to interview and to call 
certain witnesses, with no potential witnesses identified). 
Some of the grounds, however, do allege sufficient 
supporting facts. See, e.g., Issues Three (claim that 
indictment was not brought within 30 days of arrest), Four 
(claim that indictment was not properly signed and sealed), 
Seven (claim that defense counsel failed to advise Thomas 
of his right to testify) and Eleven (claim that several 
prosecution witnesses committed perjury and naming the 
specific witnesses). Needless to say, the District Court may 
well find that at least some of the claims which do allege 
sufficient facts are, nevertheless, frivolous. Certain claims, 
however, such as the claim that defense counsel failed to 
advise petitioner that he had the right to testify in his own 
defense, at least on their face present substantial issues 
upon which the District Court could have proceeded. 
 
We hold, therefore, that the District Court erred in 
summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety. Rather, 
the District Court should have taken the less drastic 
approach of paring down the extraordinarily lengthy list of 
grounds and proceeding on those -- perhaps only a few in 
number -- which did allege sufficient facts. And, of course, 
had the District Court granted Thomas's application to file 
the memorandum in which he promised to present 
additional facts, that list, and the facts supporting that list, 
may well have changed. 
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III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(c), a District Court may, in its discretion, permit 
an amendment which clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory 
in a timely filed S 2255 petition after the AEDPA's one-year 
period of limitations has expired. Because the District 
Court erred in summarily dismissing the petition and in 
failing to consider whether Thomas's proposed amendment, 
which we trust he will submit forthwith, relates back to the 
date of the petition, we will vacate and remand for 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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